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Abstract—This paper describes a trusted lightweight 
synchronisation protocol for wireless ad-hoc networks. The 
wireless ad-hoc network and wireless sensor networks is a large 
field of research. Their dynamic topologies make them difficult to 
synchronise (power consumption, slow convergence, accuracy). 
Moreover, these open networks are vulnerable to faulty nodes 
and attacks from malicious nodes. In this paper we propose to 
use the Simple Synchronisation Protocol (SiSP) enhanced with 
trust aspects making it more robust to attacks. We describe how 
to observe deviant behaviour and assign a confidence level to 
each node. Countermeasures are then adapted to the 
neighbourhood confidence level. The last part present simulation 
and results on the MASH simulator. 
Keywords—Synchronisation; Trusted protocols; Medium 
Access Control; Wireless Ad Hoc Networks; Wireless sensor 
networks. 
I. INTRODUCTION
Wireless Ad Hoc Networks promise a simple and 
decentralised way of connecting nodes, without need of 
coordination or hierarchy. Because the wireless nodes are 
generally mobile, they usually embed a limited quantity of 
energy and are considered as energy constrained. Thus, 
Medium Access Control (MAC) protocols have to minimize 
activities on medium, i.e. limit not only transmission but also 
reception activities, because of the complexity of the receiver: 
on these transceivers, the energy consumption is generally 
more important in the receive state than in transmit state. 
Nodes must enter sleep mode regularly, but also being 
available during common periods negotiated with their 1-hop 
neighbours. The nodes use the principle of rendez-vous to get 
this common period. 
To achieve such a negotiation, the synchronisation is an 
important task in the whole MAC process. Many 
synchronisation protocols and algorithms have been proposed 
[1], in order to share a common view of the time organization. 
To rely on the non-hierarchical characteristic of the Wireless 
Ad Hoc Networks, a decentralized synchronisation process is 
targeted, i.e. obtained a global synchronisation in a distributed 
fashion. Because of the collaborative nature of these protocols, 
their trust aspects must be studied, since they may be sensitive 
to attacks and malice operations. 
This paper presents SiSP, a simple and collaborative-
oriented synchronisation protocol and studies the trusted 
aspects of the protocol. A trusted version of SiSP is proposed 
and studied by the use of the MASH simulator.  
The reminder of this paper is following: in the next section, 
we remind the main challenges on synchronisation and trust 
aspects. Then, the SiSP protocol and its weaknesses and 
deviant behaviour are presented. A trusted version of SiSP is 
then being proposed, with some results obtained with this 
reinforced version of the protocol. 
II. MAIN CHALLENGES
Wireless Ad-hoc networks refer to a lot of specific areas of 
wireless networks. Since there isn’t any infrastructure, all 
nodes must sense the environment to construct their own 
neighbourhood image. This characteristic has a significant 
impact on node lifetime, reliability or even security. In order to 
save energy, Wireless Ad Hoc Networks often use rendez-
vous-based protocols or synchronisation protocols at MAC-
level. 
A. Synchronisation protocols
Time synchronisation over Wireless Networks is a wide
research subject for a very long time [1], and is still an active 
field of research [2], since it impacts on several aspects such as 
MAC, Quality of Service, energy saving, data timestamping, 
etc. In the literature, the synchronisation protocols are 
evaluated by several metrics: synchronisation accuracy, energy 
consumption, overhead, convergence speed. They can use 
various approaches which can be classified in two categories. 
A first category of synchronisation protocols is built on a 
hierarchical architecture, based on a hierarchical topology such 
as a star or a tree topology. Timing-sync Protocol for Sensor 
Networks (TPSN) [3] is an example of synchronisation 
protocol based on a hierarchy, where each node is assigned a 
hierarchical level. The root node, on zero level, is unique, and 
must be re-elected each time the topology changes. A time 
synchronisation accuracy analysis, based on a real 
implementation with MICA motes with TinyOS has been 
conducted in [3]; show an average accuracy of less than 20µs. 
Flooding Time Synchronisation Protocol (FTSP) [4] is an 
improvement of TPSN. With TPSN, topology changes due to 
node failure or link instability are heavy to report. The flooding 
nature of FTSP reinforces the quality of the synchronisation 
when the topology changes. The authors of [4] have studied the 
performances of FTSP and report an average synchronisation 
error of 10µs. Time Synchronised Mesh Protocol (TSMP) [5] is 
the synchronisation protocol used on WirelessHART. It 
proposes a synchronisation service used for scheduling the 
medium accesses, allowing collision free schemes on a 
multichannel TDMA approach. TSMP synchronisation also 
provides a data time-stamping service used by sensors or 
actuators. TSMP provides a synchronisation precision of 
hundreds µs and supports scaling thanks to the centralized 
structure of the synchronisation. Wireless Deterministic Clock 
Synchronisation (WiDeCS) [6] is another example of 
synchronisation protocol based on a hierarchical architecture, 
coupled with a MB-OFDM PHY layer and a TDMA-based 
MAC-layer. An impressive precision of 100ns is achieved with 
a VHDL implementation on a simulator.  
Another synchronisation protocol category is based on a 
shared clock obtained via a succession of consensuses [8]. This 
category is interesting since these protocols do not require a 
centralised organisation to synchronise the nodes. One of the 
first synchronisation protocols in this category is Reference 
Broadcast Synchronisation (RBS) [9]. RBS is based on a 
“clap” broadcasted by one of the node. This “clap” is 
considered as a reference by the other nodes of the network: 
just after the reception of the clap, the receiver nodes broadcast 
the timestamp corresponding to the instant of the clap 
reception, using their own clock. The timestamp exchanges 
enable the nodes to compute an image of their clock offset. 
This mode of synchronisation is often reported as “Receiver-
to-receiver” synchronisation [10]. After several cycles, the 
nodes converge on a shared clock, based on the consensus. 
Simple Synchronisation Protocol (SiSP) [11] is also based on a 
consensual process: like RBS, SiSP regularly broadcasts 
SYNC messages containing the consensual clock, noted 
“Shared Clock” (SCLK). Every node receiving a SYNC 
message must average the received value with its local SCLK 
value. After several SYNC message exchanges, the nodes 
share a common synchronisation. As our study is based on 
SiSP, this protocol will be presented in the next section of this 
paper. 
The table 1 resume the main characteristics of the protocols 
cited before. 
TABLE 1: MAIN CHARACTERISTICS OF CITED PROTOCOLS 
Protocol Category Physical Layer Accuracy 
TPSN Hierarchical IEEE 802.15. 17µs 
FTSP Hierarchical 38.4kbps, 433MHz (Mica2) 10µs 
TSMP Hierarchical IEEE 802.15.4 100µs 
WiDeCS Hierarchical MB-OFDM 100ns 
RBS Consensual IEEE 802.11b 30µs 
SiSP Consensual IEEE 802.15.4 50µs 
B. Trust aspects
One of the most important aspects of WSN is that the
network topology is very dynamic and must be self-configured 
and quickly reconfigured. The changes in topology, the data 
burst for reconfigurations, the low data rates for power saving 
make synchronisation in WSN a difficult challenge. SiSP 
protocol presented in the next chapter seems really interesting 
for a lightweight, accurate, energy saving, synchronisation 
protocol. However, in mobile ad-hoc networks (MANET), the 
decentralized nature of the network makes it vulnerable to 
deviant node behaviours. Deviant nodes can be faulty or 
malicious nodes. 
While faulty nodes are transmitting erroneous data, 
malicious node tries to corrupt the synchronisation for its own 
interest. These interests are various (security hack, 
countermeasures, misused identity…) and results in a slow 
synchronization convergence, a traffic increase and a network 
life time reduced.  
Security and reliability are key parameters of WSN. Our 
approach is to use trust aspects to improve every aspects and 
deal with this problem. 
The trust management is social control mechanism which 
enable deviant behaviour detection. The general idea is to 
observe neighbour node behaviours in order to compare to a 
“normal” behaviour. In order to process this comparison they 
must affect to neighbour nodes a confidence level. This 
confidence level being is computed by the difference between 
observed and normal behaviour. This confidence level can then 
be used to adapt or prevent interactions with untrusted nodes. 
These last stage consequences are entities exclusion of all 
“social” interactions. This exclusion called social control 
mechanism is often associated with the reputation notion. A 
node reputation is built on the long term confidence level from 
all trusted neighbour nodes. 
Node mobility and quick network reconfigurations from 
WSN make it difficult to model since it is an open system. A 
trust in the WSN state of the art can be found in [12][13]. 
However most of the approaches using trust aspects have been 
focused on routing protocols [11], data aggregation [11] or 
intrusion detection [11]. Very few recent works try to apply 
these technics into the MAC layers. For example in [17] an 
evaluation of MAC layer misbehaviours in the IEEE 802.11 
protocol is achieved.  
III. SIMPLE SYNCHRONISATION PROTOCOL
To achieve global synchronisation over the wireless 
network, we have proposed in [11] a lightweight protocol 
called SiSP, for “Simple Synchronisation Protocol”.  
A. SiSP description
SiSP enables the nodes to establish a Shared Clock (SCLK)
among all the nodes of the wireless network. The SCLK 
enables the nodes to share a common time base to coordinate 
medium accesses, generate timestamps for application events 
or synchronise sleeping periods to maximise the autonomy of a 
battery-powered node. The SCLK is a relative clock and is 
subject to deviation. It can be converted into absolute time/date 
by a gateway node which runs a global synchronisation 
protocol such as Network Time Protocol (NTP). SCLK is 
based on a local counter which update frequency is assumed to 
be the same on all nodes. SiSP aims to have these counters 
converge via a series of successive consensus, until the 
instantaneous values are the same for all nodes of the network. 
The main advantage of SiSP over well-known synchronisation 
protocols such as RBS or TPSN [10] is that it does not rely on 
a particular topology or even a hierarchy. SiSP is totally ad-hoc 
and does not require any particular MAC precaution: SiSP 
messages may be included in the payload of broadcasted 
frames such as beacons. 
In the basic version, SiSP defines only one message: 
SYNC. SYNC contains the SCLK value of the node at the 
supposed instant of the SYNC message transmission. SYNC 
message is broadcasted as soon as possible but does not require 
a constant sending interval. The smaller the interval between 
SYNC messages, the faster is the convergence. Upon SYNC 
frame reception, the SiSP algorithm described below is 
executed. 
Algorithm 1: SiSP SYNC indication subroutine 
rclk = extracted received clock from sispPayload 
if rclk Į sclk: 
 sclk = ( sclk + rclk ) / 2 
  synchroFlag ß false 
else: 
 synchroFlag ß true 
endif 
Let’s consider a sispSyncIndication subroutine 
(Algorithm 1) called on message reception, beacon or SYNC 
message: The received clock (RCLK) is extracted from the 
incoming message payload and compared to the receiver's 
SCLK. If the two values are equal, the SCLK of the two nodes 
have converged: the two nodes are synchronised. If the values 
are different, the mean is calculated, rounded and applied by 
the receiver node as its new value of SCLK. In a few cycles, 
depending on the number of nodes and the topology, a 
consensus is reached. SCLK consensus is obtained in a 
decentralized way, without any hierarchical prerogative. 
Moreover, SiSP algorithm is simple (integer sums and division 
by 2) and perfectly fits on tiniest microprocessors.  
B. Protocol Weaknesses and deviant behaviours
However the simplicity of SiSP makes it vulnerable to deviant 
behaviours. In order to deal with these weaknesses, we are 
going to make a survey of these behaviours. This section tries 
to list both faulty and malicious behaviours. We will take in 
consideration transmissions them-selves and consequences of 
these transmissions in order to define symptoms which can be 
observed at a network level. 
TABLE 2 :ATTACKS DESCRIPTION 
Attack Name Description 
Random clock 
(RC) 
The node transmit random shared clock. This attack only 
tries to modify the shared clock value. 
Fixed clock 
(FC) 
The node doesn’t modify its own shared clock. This 
attack only tries to modify the shared clock value. 
Misused identity 
(MI) 
The node transmits a faulty or misused source address. 
This attack tries to fake a node identity. 
Quick clock 
(QC) 
The node transmits its shared clock more often than 
planned. The shared clock value isn’t targeted. This 
attack doesn’t respect the normal behaviour rules. 
A node using SiSP assumes that all its neighbours have a 
normal behaviour. It is then vulnerable to bad data or 
commands from these neighbours. The deviant behaviour 
observed can be the consequences from faulty hardware, bugs 
or even malicious nodes trying to break or disturb the 
synchronisation. Since WSN are open systems, they are 
particularly vulnerable to malicious node intrusion. 
In this work we will focus on malicious behaviours where 
the node manufacturer intention is to disturb the WSN. We are 
going to address the malicious behaviours listed in table 2. 
IV. TRUSTED SISP
In order to deal with these attacks we propose to enhance 
SiSP with trust aspects. However as mentioned above a 
confidence policy is quite complex to develop because a WSN 
node has constraints: 
- Low computational power often not compatible with a
transmission history management used to detect
malicious behaviours,
- Distributed trust management because it is not
possible to use a global network model,
- No authentication is used which is a crucial problem
since in all approaches using trust aspects, a
confidence level is associated to an identity.
The last point is really important and in this paper we 
propose to use trust as it is done in [5] [5]  for WSN routing. 
However, in our case we use the confidence level to estimate 
neighbourhood reliability instead of an independent neighbour 
level. An untrusty neighbourhood is a node set where at least 
one malicious or faulty node is detected. As soon as a node 
supposes its neighbourhood untrusty, it enters a degraded 
mode. The degraded mode is a minimal function mode where 
the node only does what the network is expecting from it. This 
mode must prevent any neighbourhood interactions for shared 
clock synchronisation. The whole neighbourhood will be in 
quarantine when all the nodes of a zone will adopt the 
degraded mode. 
In the next subsections we are going to address attacks 
listed in table 2 using trust aspects. For each attack we present 
observed symptoms and countermeasures envisaged. 
A. Attack symptoms and countermeasures
For the “Random Clock” (RC) and “Fixed Clock” (FC)
attacks, it is the shared clock value that is targeted. In these 
cases a history of neighbour last values should detect these 
attacks. The standard deviation of the value will tell us if the 
value is fixed or converging.  
In the case of “Misused Identity” (MI) attacks, the lie can 
only be detected if the node identity is misused in its 
neighbourhood (confidence level will be drastically decreased). 
If a lie is suspected, the confidence level will be decreased 
proportionally to the probability of the deviance behaviour. For 
instance, a neighbourhood where new identities abnormally 
increase should be penalized.  
For the “Quick Clock” (QC) attack, if a node does not lie 
on its identity, this behaviour is easily detected. If it is not the 
case the attack will be a particular case of the “Misused 
Identity” attack.  
B. Penalization
When the attacks are detected the node confidence level
should be penalized. This level will be decreased accordingly 
to malicious level. These levels are presented in table 3 where 
n is the identity of the node and id the identity of a neighbour 
node. 
TABLE 3: ATTACKS PENALIZATION 
Attacks Detection Penalization 
MI id  = n trust(id)=0 
MI 
New neighbours abnormally 
increase 
trust(id)new neighbours== 0 
FC 
Too small shared clock 
deviation estimated compared 
to SCLK(n) 
trust(id)t+1== trust(id)t  -  at 
RC 
Not correlated shared clock 
compared to SCLK(n) 
trust(id)t+1== trust(id)t -  b 
QC Too many SYNC(id) messages trust(id)t+1==  trust(id)t - c 
On the other hand it is necessary to restore the confidence 
level over time for both node and neighborhood. Indeed, even a 
low mobility makes malicious nodes able to quit a 
neighborhood for another one. Moreover the malicious nodes 
can be suppressed from the network by moving to a bad 
location or even depleted batteries. In some cases a mistrust 
neighborhood case could result from several exceptional events 
coincidence. In this case the confidence should be restored 
over the time by slowly increasing the confidence level. This 
mechanism is described by Algorithm 2, where e in [0,1] is 
generally called forgetfulness constant. 
Algorithm 2: Confidence level restoration 
for each id in neigboorList do: 
  trust(id) = (1 - e) trust(id) + e 
done 
C. Countermeasures
Trust in identifiers is used to estimate trust in an entire
neighbourhood. A neighbourhood is considered untrusty when 
one of its neighbours has a low confidence level.  
The only countermeasure envisaged in this paper is to enter 
in a degraded mode. In this mode the node still listen to SYNC 
messages but do not send its own SYNC message until the 
confidence level is over the threshold. The goal of this mode is 
the progressive isolation of the presumed attacker node. This 
should resume quarantining the zone around the attacker.  
V. SIMULATIONS RESULTS
A. Simulation parameters
We have used a tool called MASH (Multi-agent
Software/Hardware) simulator [5] [5]. It enables both the 
simulation and the execution of embedded distributed and 
decentralized systems: 
- using real world agent behaviours by injecting them in
the simulated system (an interaction protocol can be
seen as a pattern of behaviour, the behaviour is
inferred from transmitted messages);
- using realistic physical models at the global level
(environment models, wave propagation models, etc.)
or at node level (energy consumption model, etc.).
These models are computed with external tools
(Matlab/Simulink, Labview).
The figure 1 presents on the left side a sensor network 
Figure 1.  MASH simulator 
deployed upon an underground river. On the top right 
hexadecimal format frames are displayed. In this figure frames 
are transmitted from a simulated agent to a real embedded 
agent. On the bottom left a window is displayed when you 
click on an agent in order to spy it. The figure present the agent 
number 496 details: its clock (4181208), the global mean clock 
(17849826) this clock is not known by the agent and the 
difference between the 2 clocks. Under these values we can 
notice that this node consider its neighbour, the agent number 
26, which has a confidence level of 0.29, untrusty. It suspects 
that agent 26 is making a FC attack. The consequence is that 
the agent 496 enters the degraded mode not propagating its 
own clock. 
Figure 2. Test topology of trusted SiSP 
For all the simulation presented hereafter, the goal is to 
synchronise 300 nodes. The penalization parameters are a=0.8, 
b=0.05, c=0.2. These parameters have been chosen because
results presented in this paper focus on FC attacks; a better
value for b should be used to prevent RC attacks in future
works. The threshold used for going into degraded mode is
fixed to 0.5.
The test field is 750m x 500m and node communication range 
is fixed to 50m. The attackers are clustered in the centre of 
topology and all attackers perform a FC attack. All nodes start 
with a local clock value of 0 or 40M randomly chosen. The 
figure 2 presents a running simulation. The pink colour 
represents the attackers, the green colour represents nodes 
entered in degraded mode and a more or less shaded yellow 
colour represents the value of the local clock. 
Each simulation lasts 5 minutes. For each simulation we 
present the convergence time between the ideal convergence 
clock value (without any attacks) and convergence clock value 
with attackers. In parameters we have represented in blue the 
ideal convergence clock value. Respectively in red, green and 
purple the convergence clock with 1%, 5% and 10 % of 
malicious node performing a fixed clock to 0. 
B. Results
The results are presented in figure 3. In the right of this figure, 
we see the local clock chosen randomly. After this sequence 
the simulation starts and then, for the ideal case curve, the 
clock starts converging to the average clock value. The 
simulation average should be 20M but it is simulation 
dependant since the starting clock value is randomly chosen.  
Figure 3. SiSP clock value convergence 
The most interesting point is that as soon as we introduce 
malicious node the clock value starts decreasing towards 0. 
The more we introduce malicious nodes, the faster the 
convergence towards 0 is. This does not mean that nodes are 
synchronised since the clock is forced to 0. This phenomenon, 
describes that the attack succeeded in desynchronising the 
whole system. SiSP protocol is a very simple protocol not 
implementing safety or security countermeasures and as 
consequences is very sensitive to malicious nodes. These 
points will be treated by the trusted SiSP protocol proposed. 
The figure 4 describes the trusted SiSP results. It describes the 
clock value difference between the ideal case with no 
malicious nodes and scenarios with malicious nodes 
introduced. The first interesting point is that the nodes are 
synchronised. Even if it is not the ideal clock value the nodes 
are synchronised. The more we introduce malicious nodes, the 
more the difference increases. This is due to our computation 
of the average clock value. Indeed this value is computed 
including attackers which have a fixed clock to 0.  
Figure 4. Trusted SiSP Clock value convergence 
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On this figure we can see that difference quickly increases 
at the simulation beginning and then stop and decreases. This is 
particularly visible on the 10% malicious curve. The starting of 
the decrease is due to attack detection and isolation of 
malicious nodes. 
These first experiments show that FC attacks are very effective 
on the SiSP protocol since a malicious node can succeed to 
desynchronize the whole system. These attacks are detected by 
the trusted SiSP protocol presented in this paper. The degraded 
mode enables to isolate the attackers and to keep 
synchronisation active.  
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND PERSPECTIVES
In this paper we have presented a trusted lightweight 
synchronisation protocol based on the SiSP protocol. We have 
proposed a very flexible solution able to detect several kinds of 
attacks such as Fixed Clock, Random Clock, Misused 
Identity… The only countermeasure presented is that when the 
attack is detected, the node enters a degraded mode. This 
countermeasure has demonstrated that it can help keeping the 
synchronisation while SiSP protocol cannot. 
We are currently working on other kind of countermeasures 
by adapting the degraded mode enabling a better clock value 
difference. Other attacks are going to be deeply investigated in 
order to find the good a, b, c, to detect and prevent all kinds of 
attack type. Since the MASH simulator enables hardware 
emulation, our next simulation should then quickly implement 
hardware in the loop parameters. 
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